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Abstract
Background:  This study advances the use of a utility model to model physician-patient
interactions from the perspectives of physicians and patients.
Presentation of the hypothesis: In cases involving acute care, patient counseling involves a
relatively straightforward transfer of information from the physician to a patient. The patient has
less information than the physician on the impact the condition and its treatment have on utility. In
decisions involving lifestyle changes, the patient may have more information than the physician on
his/her utility of consumption; moreover, differences in discounting future health may contribute
significantly to differences between patients' preferences and physicians' recommendations.
Testing the hypothesis: The expectation of differences in internal discount rate between
patients and their physicians is discussed.
Implications of the hypothesis: This utility model provides a conceptual basis for the finding
that educational approaches alone may not effect changes in patient behavior and suggests other
economic variables that could be targeted in the attempt to produce healthier behavior.
Background
An important function of the medical community is to ad-
vise patients on healthy behavior. This occurs at the level
of the physician-patient relationship and at the core level
of public health activities. Health professionals have
many years of training that provide them a great knowl-
edge of the health effects of risk-taking behaviors. These
behaviors may be interpreted by physicians as anti-health
or irrational on the part of patients. Physicians and public
health professionals attempt to educate patients concern-
ing the risks of these activities in order to reduce the long-
term adverse health effects associated with such anti-
health behaviors as smoking, poor diet, indoor tanning,
and sedentary lifestyle.
A number of studies use utility maximizing models to
model health production and "irrational" behaviors at the
individual level. [1–4]. These studies attempt to describe
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the factors underlying patients' health behavior decision
making. The economic theory of consumer behavior indi-
cates that a rational individual will maximize his or her
utility subject to budget and time constraints and a health
production function [1,3,5–7]. These models have been
very effective in describing addictive behavior and the
quantitative impact of price on consumption [8].
Presentation of the hypothesis
The utility theory incorporates beliefs about the probabil-
ity of outcomes, the value, or utility, of these outcomes,
and the timing at which outcomes occur. Incorporating
the timing of the outcome is an essential feature as people
place more value on present consumption of goods than
they do on future consumption. The value of future goods
are "discounted". The economic justification for discount-
ing is firmly established in cost-effective analysis of health
care programs [9,10]. Discount rates for health outcomes
are greater than for monetary outcomes [11] and explain
in part why people may fail to engage in preventive health
measures [12,13].
A simple utility model can be used to describe the factors
underlying the health behavior recommendations physi-
cians give patients. This paper is based on the proposition
that patients do choose behaviors based on maximization
of utility. We explore how differences between the prefer-
ences of advisors and advisees may lead to advice from
physicians that is "irrational" when viewed from the per-
spective of patients and result in poor compliance with
physicians' lifestyle change recommendations.
Testing the hypothesis
In a medical market, a patient (a consumer) makes choic-
es regarding whether he or she will follow physician's ad-
vice or treatments, based upon his or her preferences. The
preferences of advisors (physicians) and advisees (pa-
tients) are described by their utility functions [1,3]. The
function c represents a "consumptive activity" about
which the physician is providing counseling (for example,
a medical treatment or a lifestyle activity). This may be a
harmful or beneficial activity (for example, beneficial
goods like exercise or good diet or hazardous activities
such as smoking, tanning bed, or sun exposure). The func-
tion y represents other goods, and in this case we consider
y the state of health. There are effects of consumption of c
on y. The utility of combinations of y and c are given by
up [y(t), c(t)]. Patients make current decisions (time t = 0)
on the consumption of c based on their utility function.
Patients attempt to maximize the present value of their
utility over their lifetime. The mathematical formulation
of the patients' utility function is given by equation 1:
Up(0) = ∫ e-σ
p
t  up [y(t),c(t)]
This function discounts the value of future consumption
based on the patient's time preference for health, σ. In the
patient's self-assessment of their utility, the patient's per-
ceived value of y(t) and c(t) are used. The subscript "p" is
used to distinguish preferences of the patient from those
of the doctor as described below.
In acting as the agent of the patient, the physician offers
medical advice designed to improve patients' overall well
being, that is, to maximize patients' utility. The physi-
cian's recommendations therefore can be modeled by a
similar utility function. Physicians consider a utility func-
tion based on their own medical knowledge and prefer-
ences. The subscript d (for doctor) is used to distinguish
this from the patient's utility function in equation 2.
Ud(0) = ∫ e-σ'
d
t ud [y(t),c(t)]
The central theme to be explored is that there are two po-
tential sources of misunderstanding between physicians
and patients: different valuations of u [y(t), c(t)] and dif-
ferent discount rates. While both are relevant, we will em-
phasize the importance of differences in discount rates on
lifestyle decision counseling and behavior.
We can describe medical counseling as a process in which
physicians give patients information on the components
of the utility function. Counseling entails to some extent
educating the patient about the true value of y(t) and the
effect of c(t) on y(t). The physician advises the patient
based on medical knowledge of the effect of consumption
of c on y. When c is a treatment, the physician may help
the patient determine expected effects of c(t) based on the
physician's knowledge of the effects of c on patients. For
short run decisions, the effect of the discounting term e-σt
is not important.
As an example of this, consider a physician treating a pa-
tient who has an acute bacterial pneumonia. The physi-
cian educates the patient about the expected outcome y(t)
in case the patient is left untreated (progression of the in-
fection) or if treated with antibiotic c (in which case the
infection will very likely be cured). The physician also ed-
ucates the patient about other effects of c(t), including the
potential adverse effects of treatment on utility (that is,
the physician provides medical knowledge about poten-
tial drug rashes or gastrointestinal upset). The physician
provides medical knowledge about the disease and its ex-
pected outcomes with and without treatment and about
the treatment itself. Because the physician has more infor-
mation than the patient on both the disease and its treat-
ment, patients generally follow physician advice
(notwithstanding missing an occasional dose) in such a
situation. This example of medical counseling representsBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/8
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an "information inequality" problem, solved by patient
education.
Counseling patients about "lifestyle" decisions involves
greater complexity. This manifests by several ways in
which physicians' impressions of utility may be distinctly
different than those of patients. In considering lifestyle
decisions, similar to the example above, the physician
may have medical information concerning the effect of
c(t) on y(t). However, often this medical information is
defined by statistical effects in large populations. There is
less certainty of a specific effect for the particular patient;
for an individual patient, we do not know if smoking ces-
sation or decreased fat intake will significantly change
lifespan or other components of health. Moreover, the
physician knows less about the patients' value of c(t) than
does the patient; information inequality exists but in the
opposite direction. Indeed, the physician may have a very
different impression of c(t) than does the patient (the
physician may experience less euphoria/benefit from
smoking, hamburger consumption or tanning bed use or
may feel more vitalized from exercise). Moreover, the ef-
fects of c(t) on y(t) may have prolonged time horizons for
these lifestyle activities. Because physicians and their pa-
tients may not share similar values of σ, there may be large
differences in the effects of discounting future utility be-
tween physicians and their patients.
Time preferences for health outcomes can vary considera-
bly among different people [13]. There is reason to expect
that physicians may have lower than average values of σ
(that is, they discount the future less) than the general
population. Physicians have chosen a profession requir-
ing a great degree of "delayed gratification", sacrificing
years of current income during the prolonged training pe-
riod for higher income later in life. One would also expect
that having chosen a health services career, physicians and
other health professionals likely ascribe higher values to
health and lower health discounting than the general pop-
ulation. Physicians' understanding of research linking risk
factors and health may also give them a greater sense of
certainty than their patients have of the long-term effects
of consumption c(t) on health y(t); this would result in
physicians discounting these future events less than their
patients do.
Physicians likely base their health recommendations on
their own perception of utility. There is a tendency for
people to assume that other people discount the future
similar to themselves [14]. If physicians make such an as-
sumption, they may offer advice that would not appear ra-
tional from the perspective of a patient who perceives a
very different utility function.
The potential differences between patients' and physi-
cians' impressions of the utility function can be well dem-
onstrated by tanning bed counseling. Physicians may be
dumbfounded that, despite their tireless efforts to educate
patients about the long-term adverse effects of ultraviolet
light exposure [educating patients about the effect of c(t)
on y(t)], patients still "don't get it" and continue to expose
themselves to the sun and to use tanning beds. This may
result from two differences between the physician and pa-
tient: one, differences in utility preferences for consump-
tion, and two, differences in discount rates. First, the
physician may not recognize the utility to patients of hav-
ing a tan (and its social implications). Second, the physi-
cian may be utilizing the physicians' discount rate for
future health (rather than the patient's) in assessing the
importance of future health risks on patients' utility. This
is no longer simply an "information inequality" problem
and may reflect deeper differences between the physician
and the patient. Patient counseling that is based on trans-
ferring information on the condition may not be ade-
quate for changing patient behavior.
Regarding lifestyle decisions, discounting differences are
extremely important because over time they make large
contributions to differences in the value assigned to future
health states. Assume now that the only differences be-
tween the physician and patient utility functions are in the
discount rates. In this case, there is no difference in infor-
mation or utility preferences between the patient and the
physician. The utility at a given time t is given by equation
3:
Ut = e-σ
t u [y(t),c(t)]
The assumption of consistent preferences between pa-
tients and physicians implies equation 4:
up [y(t),c(t)] = ud [y(t),c(t)]
The difference in the utility of the future health care state
assigned by the patient and the physician at any time can
be assessed as the ratio of patient to physician utility and
is given by equation 5:
e-σ
p
t up [y(t),c(t)]/ e-σ
d
t ud [y(t),c(t)] = e-σ
p
t/ e-σ
d
t = e-(σ
p
-σ
d
)t
= e-σp't
where the value σ' is the difference between the physi-
cian's and patient's discount rate. For short periods of
time and typical discount rates, the patient/physician dis-
counting ratio is approximately unity (Figure 1). For long-
er times, as might be involved in decisions reflecting life-
style changes, even small differences in discount rate re-BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/8
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sult in very large differences in patient and physician pref-
erences at later times (Figure 1).
Thus, even if patients fully understand the risks that are
likely to occur after long periods of time (such as the risk
of skin cancer associated with tanning bed use or coronary
vascular disease from excessive dietary fat), differences in
discount rate alone will result in those long-term risks
having a very low present value to patients. A physician
may feel reducing the risk of lung cancer in a smoker is
critical. The patient may discount that future risk of lung
cancer to the point that it is does not have sufficient mag-
nitude to change their choice of current behavior.
The effect of discounting is less but still considerable for
effects that have a probability of occurring at any age. For
such conditions, the cumulative effect of discounting over
time is given by summing (integrating) the discounted
value over time in equation 6:
∫ e-σ't dt = [1 - e-σ't'] / σ'
For t' up to 1 year, there is less than 10% difference in cu-
mulative effect for differences in annual discount rate σ'
up to 20% (Table 1). Over 50 years, the cumulative reduc-
tion in utility is 90% for σ' of 20%. The magnitude of dis-
counting for conditions that may occur over time, while
considerable, is not nearly as great as for those conditions
that occur only in the distant future. Discounting of most
medical conditions would be expected to fall between
these two extremes.
Implications of the hypothesis
The utility model in this study provides a ready under-
standing of the difficulties encountered by physicians
who try to modify patients' current behavior to improve
long-term health outcomes. This analysis demonstrates
that provision of medical knowledge alone may be insuf-
ficient to change patients' "rational" utility-maximizing
behavior patterns and that differences between physician
and patient preferences may contribute to physicians' er-
roneous perception of "irrational" behavior on the part of
patients.
Physicians should consider the patient's "value system" in
developing a "rational" counseling strategy. Cultural fac-
tors can be considered: in some countries/cultures there
may be a more general "live for today" (high discount
rate) attitude that could contribute to higher rates of
smoking and other medically risky behaviors. Cultural
differences in discount rates may be economically sensi-
ble if they are due to differences in life expectancies. Alter-
natively, high discount rates may contribute to behaviors
associated with lower life expectancies in these cultures.
Is there a role for physicians to try to change patients' dis-
count rate for future health in order to maximize long-
term health outcomes? Are there strategies for changing
the time preferences of patients? Unfortunately, time pref-
erences are an inherently difficult internal measure to
quantify. If we accept that patients' time preferences are
not subject to change and that they find an immediate
benefit from lifestyle activities that have long-term ad-
verse effects, we should expect that there will be a certain
Figure 1
The impact of discount rate differences between patients and
physicians is large for outcomes that occur in the distant
future. For short periods of time and typical discount rates,
discounting does not result in much difference in the value
assigned by patients and physicians to future health states.
For longer times, as might be involved in decisions reflecting
life-style changes, even small differences in discount rate
between patients and physicians result in large differences in
the value assigned to future health states.
1E-05
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
 
V
a
l
u
e
0 10 20 30 40 50
Time (Years)
0.02
0.05
0.1
0.2
Discount
rate
Table 1: Discounting for effects that have a probability of occur-
ring at any age*
Annual Discount Rate
Years of Exposure 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2
1 0.99 0.91 0.79 0.63
10 0.98 0.79 0.57 0.37
25 0.95 0.63 0.37 0.20
50 0.91 0.43 0.20 0.10
*For a given annual discount rate and a given number of years over 
which an event may occur, this table provides the ratio of the dis-
counted weight assigned to the event and the weight that would have 
been assigned had there been no discounting of future events. For 
example, if a patient with a discount rate of 0.2 is weighing the impor-
tance of a heart attack that may occur at any time over the next 10 
years, he or she assigns only 37% as much importance to the possibil-
ity as would someone who does not discount the future.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/8
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level of continued consumption of the activity despite all
efforts at patient education. On the other hand, if future
health discounting can be changed, it would provide a
novel means to improve compliance with life enhancing
behavior changes.
Other economic factors also may contribute to systematic
differences between patients' and physicians' perspectives.
Income effects may favor consumption of one good over
another. Disparities in income between physicians and
their patients may thus lead to systematic differences be-
tween physician preferences and patient preferences such
that physician recommendations may not maximize the
patients' utility function. Physicians' established positions
in society may also contribute to differing perspectives.
For example, physicians may not have the same need for
a "tan look" [lower c(t)] that a young, unmarried patient
involved in the dating game might have. Another bias that
may lead to different preferences between physicians and
their patients is selection of individuals who care more
about health (that is, individuals who exhibit greater u
[y(t), c(t)] with higher y(t) relative to other goods) for
health profession careers.
This analysis has been couched in medical terms, but it is
also applicable to other advisor/advisee relationships. For
example, consider the context of corporate managers
making decisions about benefits for employees. When the
benefit involves a short time horizon and the manager has
greater information than the employee about the effects
of the benefit, it may be sensible for the manager to make
a decision about the benefit in the employee's behalf. For
pension plan decisions, however, where there is a long
time horizon and where the value ascribed to the benefit
may be very different between the employer and the em-
ployee, the manager may make an "irrational" choice
from the employee's perspective. A highly educated high
school counselor may also wish to consider the value sys-
tem of students and their families when providing coun-
seling concerning students' long-term plans and
ambitions. Such considerations may also hold at the geo-
political level when the acute needs of a developing area
or country are in conflict with the long-term goals of a
more fully developed nation.
Terms such as "rational" and "irrational" have favorable
and pejorative connotations, respectively. How these
terms are applied to the physician's advice or to the pa-
tient's behavior is dependent on one's frame of reference,
and there may be no one "correct" answer. When a patient
acts as though σ = ∞, that is, when they act as if there is no
tomorrow at all, we would describe their behavior as irra-
tional. Some time preference (σ > 0) for current consump-
tion is sensible, however, even if just from the standpoint
that lifespan is not infinite. When physicians provide ad-
vice based on a σ  0 for future health without regard to pa-
tients' preferences, the advice may also be considered
"irrational" when viewed from the patient's perspective.
Physicians often rate patients' health status differently
than do patients, and it is already widely recognized that
physicians should listen to and try to consider the values
of their patients [15]. The economic approach presented
here provides a framework for quantification of this prin-
ciple and makes clear some of the components that must
be considered. Moreover, it makes clear that many current
patient education approaches may be inadequate to ad-
dress recognized problems in health behavior that have
impact on long term health.
This analysis is not meant to suggest that physicians
should give up on efforts to reduce anti-health behaviors.
The analysis does mean to suggest that factors underlying
patients' decision to engage in such behaviors need to be
considered. What may appear irrational to the physician
may appear quite rational to the patient. Simply educating
the patient of the physician's view will not likely suffice to
change patient behaviors. Other approaches that change
patients' preferences are needed.
Clearly, we have presented a purely theoretical model,
and the strength and validity of this model can be shown
only through empiric analysis. The model is in keeping
with data on tanning bed use. Tanning bed users are better
informed about the damaging effects of UV light than
non-tanning bed users, but they continue to engage in un-
protected UV exposure [8,16]. This information suggests
that education of long-term outcomes by itself is not suf-
ficient to cause changes in behavior, at least in part be-
cause of discounting the value of these future outcomes.
Moreover, our model clearly points to the need to change
societal beliefs concerning the value of a tan – that is,
change c(t). Until then, public health efforts to reduce tan-
ning are likely doomed to failure. The model presented
here provides a simple mathematical framework for un-
derstanding why all lifestyle change public health efforts
need to consider the current value of consumption (as
perceived by the consumer) and the impact of patients'
discounting future events.
Discounting the future has important implications for un-
derstanding patients' choices in health behaviors. The
phenomenon of discounting the future is a complex one,
inherent to humans and other animals [17,18]. Our anal-
ysis is based on the assumption of exponential discount-
ing of future events, a simplifying assumption that does
not always hold in experiments analyzing discounting be-
havior [11]. Nevertheless, other models of discounting be-
havior also show strong discounting of future events [17].
≅BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/8
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Whether discounting is normative or not, the differences
in discount rates between different people have the poten-
tial to make a significant contribution to differences in be-
havioral choices. Use of the utility maximizing model
illustrates the difficulties of changing patients' behavior
now for the benefit of future health. It is essential both
that physicians recognize this potential when counseling
patients and that public health programs take this phe-
nomenon into account.
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